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Supreme Jdicial Court of MTlaine.
BREWER BRICK CO. v. INHABITANTS OF BREWER.
It is for the legislature to determine what property, real or personal, shall be
subject to and what shall be exempt from taxation.
Exemption of property from taxation is the imposition of increased taxation
upon the non-exempt property.
The legislature cannot constitutionally transfer to municipal corporations the
power of determining upon wthat property, real or personal, taxes shall and upon
what they shall not be imposed.
Where the constitution of the state requires taxes, voted by the legislature, to be
assessed upon all taxable property in the town, or district, subject to the tax,
rateably, or in proportion to tie value of the estate or in any other similar manner,
it is not competent for the legislature, with the assent of towns,-where real estate
is situated and liable-to taxation, to provide, even by a general law, applying to
the whole state, that manufacturing establishments, going into operation after the
date of the statute, and the consent of the towu, together with the capital in-rested in such establishments, shall be exempt from taxation, while other similar
establishments, already existing in such towns, remain subject to such tax. Such
exemption is, virtually, the levy bf an increased tax upon all the taxable estate
in the town, and to that extent, depriving the owner of its value without any
equivalent benefit, either directly or indirectly.
It is essential to all just taxation that it be levied with equality and uniformity.

THIS was an action of assumpsit to recover back $309.75, paid
by the plaintiffs for taxes, on the ground that their property was
exempt.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON, 0. J.-The proceedings on the part of the defendantare admitted to have been regular, and the only question presented
is, whether the property of the plaintiff upon which the tax in
qu.estion'was asses'sed is liable to assessment.
- The. business of brick making has been carried on in the defendant town, "for more than fifty years until the present time by
the old process of making bricks with horse-power.
"The plaintiff corporation was organized under the general law
of the state on 4th June 1870 for the purpose of manufacturing
brick in the defendant town, and after its organization proceeded
at once to erect the necessary buildings and machinery, for the
manufacture of brick by new processes, in which business it has
been engaged to the present time.
At the -annual town meeting of the defendant town, held March
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14th 1870, the following vote was passed, viz.: "Voted that the
town will exempt from taxation for a term of ten years manufacturing and refining establishments hereafter erected in town, and
the capital used for operating the same, together with such machinery hereafter put into buildings already erected, but not now
used as such, and the capital used for operating the same. Provided, that the capital invested shall not be less than $10,000; and
provided further, that this vote shall not be construed to apply tmanufacturing or business now carried on in the town, and no
distillery of intoxicating drinks or malt beer shall be entitled to
the benefit of this vote."
The estate of the plaintiffs was duly assessed for its just and
proportional share upon the whole valuation of the property of
the town, liable to assessment. The plaintiffs claim exemption
from contributing toward the public expenses under and by virtue
of this vote of the town.
By an Act approved March 8th 1864, c. 234, § 1, it is enacted
that "all manufacturing establishments, and all establishments for
refining, purifying or in any way enhancing the value of any article
or articles already manufactured, hereafter erected by individuals
or by incorporated companies; and all the machinery and capital
used'for operating the same, together with all such machinery
hereafter put into buildings already erected, but not now occupied;
and all the capital used for operating the same, are exempted
from taxation for a term not exceeding ten years after the passage
of this act, where the amount of capital actually invested shall
.exceed the sum of two thousand dollars. Provided, towns and
cities in which such manufacturing establishments or refineries may
be located, or in which it may be proposed to establish fie same,
shall in a legal manner give their assent to such exemption, and
such assent shall have the force of a contract and be binding for
the full term specified : and providedfurtlter, that all property so
exempted shall be entered from year to year on the assessment
book-, and returned with.the valuations of the several towns and
cities when'required'by the state for the purposes'of making the
state valuation." By an Act approved Feb. 1867, c. 76, § 1, the
exemption referred to in the Act of 1864, c. 234, § 1, takes effect
from the date of the contract authorized by that act. By an
act approved March 12th 1869, c. 65, § 1, the exemption referred
to takes effect "from the date of the assent giyen by the town to
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such exemption." The preceding legislation on this subject is
found condensed in R. S. 1871, c. 6, § 9.
Taxation exacts money from individuals as and for their contribatory share of the public burdens. A tax is generally understood to
mean the imposition of a duty or impost for the support of government: Pray v. Northern Liberties, 81 Penna. 69. " Taxes are
burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons or
property," says DILLON, C. J., in Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa
28, "to raise money for public purposes or to accomplish some governmental end." Private property may be taken under the power
of eminent domain for public purposes, if just compensation therefor be made. But for private purposes it cannot be wrested from
its owner even with compensation.
It has been settled by a series of decisions that the legislature
cannot constitutionally authorize towns to raise money by taxation
to give or loan to individuals or corporations for private purposes.
A good- public house may be very desirable, but in Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin justly
treated with little consideration the claim of a right to favor under
the power of taxation the construction of a public hotel, though the
aid was to be rendered expressly "in view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the city." It
was there decided that the public could not be compelled to aid
such an enterprise from any regard to the incidental benefits to be
derived therefrom.
It may be very desirable to have a saw-mill in a town, and those
who wish it have full liberty to erect it,-but the inhabita-its cannot legally be taxed to raise money to give or to loan to those who
propose for their own benefit to erect one or to take down one already erected and to remove it from one town to another: Allen v.
Jay, 60 Me. 124; s. c. 12 Am. Law Reg. 481. A conflagration
sweeps over a city destroying its wealth by millions. Its rebuilding
is absolutely necessary for its commercial wants. But each lot of
land is private property-each building to be erected thereon will be
private property. Its erection is for private use. After full consideration it was decided that the inhabitants of the city could not be
taxed to raise money to loan to the sufferers to enable them to rebuild: Lowell v. Boston, Mass. In The Cbmmercial Bank v. The
Gity of Iola, 2 Dillon 853, it was held that the legislature of a state
had no authority to authorize taxation in aid of private enterprise
VOL. XXI.--48

BRICK CO. v. INHABITANTS OF BREWER.

and objects; municipal bonds issued. under legislative authority to
be paid by taxation as a bonus or donation to secure the location, or
aid in the erection of a manufactory or foundry owned by private
individuals, are void even in the hands of owners for value.
Contingent and incidental benefits may arise from the introduction of manufacturing capital whenever the enterprise is successful. But the reverse may equally ensue, and the enterprise' become an injurious failure. The inhabitants of a town cannot
legally be taxed to raise money to give or to loan to individuals
or corporations fir private purposes on account of any supposed
incidental advantages which may accrue therefrom. The benefits
are precisely those arising from the introduction of capital or labor,
and none other. It matters not whether it be the building of the
huge factory of the capitalist or the cottage of the laborer, the
benefits are the.same in kind and differ only in degree. There
are benefits arising from the introduction of capital well invested
and labor well employed; but they are of the-same nature as
those arising from the existent capital of the place in which the
incoming capital is to be employed. One is just as much entitled
to.protection a the other, and no more. But this benefit, whatever it. may be, if any, arises from all capital and all labor, and as
all labor and capital are equally entitled to equal protection according to their extent, it follows that equal protection to all leaves
the matter as it. foufnd it. Hence, it is universally held that thd
incidental benefits of capital afford no justification for partial
taxation.
It is conceded in the argument that towns and cities cannot
constitutionally be authorized to raise by taxation money to be
given away. The plaintiffs' share of the expenses of defendant
town for all public purposes,- is admitted to be $309.75. Ir The
town was .empowered to raise that sum to give the plaintifl, it is
admitted that the act,so empowering them would be unconstitutional, for if the town may raise, money to give-to A., they may
do the same for B., and so on, and-the property of the minority
would be subject to the will of the majority. But the remission
of the tax by a vote of the town, is in substance, the same as a
gift. What matters it to the plaintiffs or the defendant, whether
the town vote to give $309.75 to the. plaintiffs, or exempt tteif
property from its just and proportional tax and assess the amount
of such exemption upon the-remaining estate liable to taxation ?
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It is a gift. The money raised by the rest of the tax-payers is
raised to give away; auid if it may be done for these plaintiffs it
may be done for any other inhabitant-as well.
But there are other and grave objections to -the constitutionality of the statute upon which-the plaintiffs rely.
By the Constitution, article 9, § 7, "while the public expenses
shall be assessed on polls and estates, a general valuation. shall
be taken at least -once in ten years.""
The expenses for which assessments are to be. made shall be
public, tlhise appertaining to the public seivice. No authority is
given, either expressly or by. implication, to assess -for merely
private purposes, as to-give away-or to loan to individuals.
By Art. 9, § 8,. "all taxes -upon. real estate assessed; by au:
thority of thig state,- shall be apportioned and assessed equally according to the just value thereof." Though this section applies
specially-to real- estate, yet the very idea.of-taxation implies an
equal apportionment and assessment upon, all property real and
personal'." according to its just-value," It cannot for a moment
be admitted that the Constitution authorizes an unequal apportion.
ment -and assessment, upon real and *personal estate without any
referenee to its-just value.
t
J
The power to -impose tgxes is broad and liberal: for roads that
there may be facilities -for travel ; -for schools that the people may
be6 educated; for libraries that their means of improvement may be
increased , for the poor lest -they may- siffr from want.; for. the
Police of the state; -for the safety.-of.the public and that crime
may be detected, for the courts of law, that individual rights may
b'protectcd and enf6rded, an'dthat crime when proven may receive
its fitting punishment; iifine for .any and all .purposes -which in
the most liberal'sense can -be deemed public; "Taxation having
for its only legitimate objectthe -raising of money for publiQ purposes and the proper-needs of government, the exaction-of moneys
frbmn the citizens for other-purposes is not a proper exercise- of this,
power and must therefore be unauthorized :" Cooley w Consti:

ttitional Limitations 487.

-

--

The legislature may determine the amount. of taxation. and
selkt the- objects. They may..exempt by general and.uniform
laws,*certain descriptions pf-property from taxatiom, and lay the
burden of supporting government elsewhere.
.
But while there are no limits in the amount of taxation for
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public purposes, nor in the subject-matter upon which it may be
imposed, the requirements that it shall be uniform and equal upon
the valuations made, are universal.
The general tax act is based upon the whole valuation of the
state. The taxes are appointed among the several towns in the
ratio of their respective valuations. The manufacturing capital to
be exempted by the statute is included in the valuation of the town
in which the investment is made. Whether there shall be an exemption depends upon the vote of the town. Now it is for the
legislature to impose taxes and to exempt from taxation. But
exemption from taxation includes the imposition of taxes. To the
precise extent that one man's estate is exempted from taxation, to
that same extent is there an imposition of the amount exempted
upon the rest of the inhabitants. The $309.75 of which the plaintiffs would escape the payment is imposed upon the rest of the inhabitants. This imposition of and this exemption from taxation are
by the town and not by the legislature.
To have uniformity of taxation the imposition ofand the exemption
from taxation must be by one and the same authority-that of the
legislature. It is for the legislature to determine upon what subject-matter taxation shall be imposed upon land, upon loans, upon
stock, &c., but the subject-matter once fixed the rule is general and
applies to all property within its provisions. So it -may relieve
certain species of property from taxation, as the tools of the
laborer, the churches of religious societies ; but upon the non-exempted estate the taxation must be uniform as the exemptions are
uniform. It cannot be pretended that it would b- constitutional
to impose a tax on a church in A., and to exempt one of the same
character in B. ; to say that all or a part of the farms in the former
shall be subject to a tax, and those in the latter be free therefrom.
But if it be conceded that each town has the right to tax part
and exempt part of the property located therein, whatever its character, uniformity in relation to the subject-matter as well as to the
ratio of taxation is at an end.
If of the innumerable varieties of manufacture different towns
exempt different or the same kind of manufactures, the utter want
of uniformity is obvious. The cotton manufacturer in one town is
exempt, while in the next the woollen manufacturer pays his proportional share of the public burden. Nor is this all ; if the same
kind of manufacture has been heretofore carried on as is proposed

BRICK CO. v. INHABITANTS OF BREWER.

to be exefnipted from the payment of taxes, then in the same town
in case of exemption will be seen the remarkable spectacle of
two manufacturers engaged in the same industrial pursuits, the one
with his capital freed from all public burdens, the other, bearing
his just and proportional share. The larger the investment of
exempted capital the heavier the burden upon the non-exempted
capital. Of two competing capitalists in the same branch of industry, one goes into the market with goods relieved from taxes,
while the goods of the other bear the burden. One manufacturer
is taxed for his own estate and for that which is exempted, to relieve his competing neighbor, and to enable him to undersell him
in the common market; and that is precisely the relation these plaintiffs bear to their competing brick-makers. A grosser inequality is
harlly conceivable.
Nor is there any conceivable benefit to any one from this injustice. The town voting, the exemption -will be one in which the proposed manufacture therein to be exempted could or could not be
advantageously carried on. If the former, the very principle of
self-interest will induce such manufacturer to establish himself in
the town so voting without the inducement of such vote. It would
then be the unnecessary giving of money to one whose interests
would be promoted by manufacturing in the place in question. It
would be compelling the rest of the inhabitants to add to the gains
of a capitalist without participation therein. If otherwise, and the
town so voting is an injudicious place for the location of manufactories to be exempted, it is an invitation to the manufacturer to engage
in a losing business with a proffer to bear the loss to the extent of
the exemption. The exemption is either unnecessary or unwise.
The plaintiffs have only paid their proportional share of the
taxes in the defendant town according to its valuation. The plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. To permit them to do so would
be to approve an unconstitutional taxation for private purposes,
and to sanction a system which would destroy all uniformity as to
the property upon which taxes are to be imposed, and all equality
as to the ratio so far as regards the valuation. It can never be admitted that the':constitution of this state permits or allows the taxation of a portion of its citizens for the private benefit of a chosen
few, and that the taxes raised for such a purpose shall be assessed
without reference to uniformity of taxable property or equality of
ratio.
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It becomes, therefore, entirely.-unnecessary to -consider whether
the plaintiffs by the terms'of the vote"are or.are not within the
section of the statute under which they claim exemption from taxation.

Plaintiffs notisuited.
1'

The foregoing opinion embraces much
the same principles and views as that
6fAllen v. Jay, 12 Am.'Law Reg. N. S.
481 ; and ourviews upon the general
question of exercising the prerogative
power of taxation by government, state
or national, in any form, for the adiancement of private enterprises, are
there-so fully expressed that.we shall
attempt nothing more in the same direction which our comments there took.
The statute in the present case seems in
nothing different from the one there considered, except that here it is general and
actually provides for the exemption from
taxation of all manufacturing establishments, &c., under certain conditions
and limitations, one of which is, that
the towns where situate should approve
the same. In short,! it seems -but an
attempt to compass the same result attempted in Allen v.-Jay, with somewhat
more of the form of ordinary legislation,
kud thus-give -it more the appearance
of legislation and less that bf a decree or
license. But 'as the principle is the
same, we need spend no time upon the
form. The essence of the whole proceeding by the legislature and the town
is, to exempt a particular manufacturing
ostablishment, together with its capital,
from all taxation, while other property
should remain subject to taxation. The
effect of such a principle would be to
*zive the legislature power to assess all
taxes upon any particular species of
property, and thus render it valueless,
or in other words, to confiscate it for
the public good, or convenience, or
whim, as the case may be. We have
no occasion here to discuss the general
power of taxation in free governments,

where there is no constitutional restriction. It may be conceded, perhaits,
thht as this is'a function'df the lawmaking power, where'there is no restriction in the organic law, it must
be unlimited, except what limitation
results from the very nature of the
function or the import of the term taxa"tion, which is an orderly levry of money
upon persons or property, or both. This
might be sufficient to restrain the legislature from making a mere arbitrary
levy upon the property or person of one
while exempting others in the same
situation. But it seems to us more questionable' whether, allowing the state
legislature the same omnipotent legislative power which has always been accorded to the British Parliament, and
we see no good reason why we -should
not, in the absence of -all restriction in
the organic law, we should not be driven
to the conclusion that such supreme
legislative authority may, for reasons
satisfactory to thicm, exempt such business as they deem specially contributing
their share of the public burdens in other
modes, from further taxation for that
purpose. This may possibly be so.
'But all the American states have
written constitutions, or something which
they regard Is an organic law, restraining in certain particulars the omnipotence
of the legisiative power. "And there is
nothing more obvious in all of these
constitutious, as a general thing, than
the effort to hinder and prohibit all
legislative devices for the unequal appropriation of private property for the public
use. 1. This is done by requiring full
compensation when the property is taken
under the power of eminent domain.
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This is most sedulously guarded by the
most specific and stringent provisiona in.
nearly all the written constitutions of
the.states. 2. By most of these written
constitutions of the states it is expiessly
provided, as in that of Maine, that all
taxes shall be assessed and apportioned
equally upon the polls and iatable property, according to its just value. In
many of the state constitutinfis the pro-:
vision for equal taxation of all property
is s-till more carefully definea. But in
all the purpose is the same, to secure all
the inhabitants of the state from unequal and unjust discrimination in the
assessment of taxes. It'requires no
argument to show that there is no fane-

tion of governient mo e vital to liberty
oi" more liable to abuse. The appalling
injustice which may be practised under
such a law as the one brought in question here is very jus tly exposed in the
able opinion orthe lekrn'ed:Chief Justice,
and we forbear any attempt to add to it.
Tuie country have great cause Tor thankfulness when the courts oppose such firm
and just resistance to the attempts of
interested parties to induce the legislature to usurp, for the -benefit of such
parties, those arbitrary mode% of distributing unequal favors through the abuse
of the power of taxation.
I.F. R.

Utbvrl of Appeals of Kentucky.
,JOSIAH MOXLEY,

APPELiANT, V. C.

G. RAGUN"XT

AL., APPZLLIU.

A debtor cannot by an"executory contract, such as a stipulation in a promissory
note, waive the benefit of the state exemption laws, so as to estop himself from
subsequently claiming the exemption.

Tup appellant Moxley being largely indebted, executed a conyey:
ance to Hugh Bristow, in trust, of all his estate, consisting of land
and personally, for the payment of his debts, reserving to himself
by the terms of thb deed such.property only as was by law exempt
from executinn. The trustee procepdpd to sell the property by virtue of the trust, leaving set apart to the appellant such articles of
property as were bylaw exemptfrom sale, the latter being at the
time a housekeeper ,with a family and entitled to the exemption.
The appellee Maupin was a. creditor of the appellant, holding his
note for $533 in the following terms :$533.38.

Mt. Sterling, Ky.
Nov. 1st 1871.
One day after date I promise to pay to the order of Daniel
Maupin, five hundred rind thirty-three dollars, without defalcation
6r discount, for value received, and without any relief whatever
from the appraisement, exemption or valuation laws of the state
of Kentucky, to bear ten per cnt. interest from this date.
JOSIAH MOXLEY.
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Upon this note Maupin obtained a judgment and had h is execution issued, that was levied by the sheriff on this exempted property.
The sheriff refusing to sell, he was indemnified by Maupin and required to make the sale. Before the sale took place this action
was instituted by the appellant to recover the property.
15n. ff. Holt and Thoma8Turner, for the appellant.
Breckenridge d Buckner, for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-The only question presented by the record is, can a
debtor, by the execution of a note containing such stipulations as
in this case, waive the benefit of the law exempting certain property from execution, so as to preclude him from afterwards asserting his right to it.
It is well settled that a debtor may sell his personal property
exempt from execution, either in payment of a debt or for any other
valuable consideration, so as to vesoin the purchaser the absolute
title, or even to mortgage it, which is in effect a sale, to secure the
payment of a debt.

There is an essential difference, however, between an executed
contract by which the owner is divested of title, and an executory
agreement by which the debtor merely promises that in the future
he will not take advantage of or claim the benefits of a particular
statute.
Executory agreements are generally enforced, and as much obligatory on parties as if in fact executed ; but there are exceptions
to this general rule. No one in this state is entitled to the benefit of the exemption laws but a housekeeper with a family; and the
legislature certainly intended by the enactment of such laws to provide more for the dependent family of the debtor than the debtor
himself. Every honest man has a desire to fulfil all his obligations,
and such are always willing to comply with the demands of a creditor by giving to the latter any assurance he may exact as an evidence of his intention to pay his debt. The law in its wisdom
for the poor and needy has said that certain property shall not be
liable for debt, not so much to relieve the debtor as to protect his
family against such improvident acts as reduce the family to want.
Such is the policy of the law; and this contract was made not
only in disregard of this policy but to annul the law itself, so far
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ss it affected the debt sought to be recovered. If such a contract
is upheld, the exemption law of the state would be a blank upon the
statute book, and deprive the destitute of all claim they have to its
beneficent provisions. Suppose one should agree with his creditor
that he would never take the benefit of the bailkrupt law, or that
if he failed to pay a debt due on a certain day that his land should
be forfeited and never after subject to redemption,-can it be pretended that such contracts could be enforced? The stipulations
contained in the note vested the appellee with neither the right to
the property nor the right to the possession of it; nor ban its recitals
work an estoppel, as the one party knew or is presumed, ,_ .ave
known as much of the law with reference to such a contract as the
other. The agreement to waive this right is illegal and void.
As said by DENIO, J., in the case of Knutler v. Rewomb, "the
law does not permit its process to be used to accomplish ends which
its policy forbids, though the parties may by a prospective contract
agree to iuch use :" 81 Barbour 170; 9 Howard 547.
The court below should have told the jury that this attempted
waiver'on the part of appellant was void; and having refused to do
so, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions
to award the appellant a new trial.
We have read the foregoing opinion
with interest, not only on account of the
natural and perspicuous manner in
which the question is presented, bu especially on account of the interest ot the
question itself. At first view one would
naturally incline to uphold the contract
made by the debtor at the time he became such, that all his property, whether
exempt from execution or not, should
he held liable for the payment of the
debt. This being the contract, it will
prevail until some reason appears why
it should not. And this burden is
thrown upon the debtor, -Any reason
which he may urge will naturally have
a suspicious lo.ok, coming from such a
source, and bling adduced to establish
his right to 'violate his own contract,
freely made and upon full consideration.
There should be something very clear
and unanswerable urged in favor of

such a course, before the courts will feel
prepared to adopt it..
It is somewhat questionable how far
the ground assumed in the opinion, that
these exemptions of property of the
debtor from final process in the collection of debts, am to be regarded as
something more sacred than personal
exemptions, which the debtor might
waive; and that they form a kind of
policy of the law for the support of the
families of honseholders, will bear full
examiation. It seems very clear, from
the adjudlged cases, Dosw v. CARney, 103
Mass. 181, and from the constant practice in most of the states, that the benefits of such exemptions may be waived
by the debtor, if done in the present
tense, by way of executed contract,
which could not be done if against the
policy of the law. It has been eery
day's practice throughout New England,
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while the old "grab" law, as it was
called, of attachment of property upon
mesne process existed, for the debtor to
offer his exempted property to the officer
by way of attachment, in order to save
the necessity of finding hail for the surrender of the hody, which the process
required the officer to arrest, in default
of property sufficient to secure the debt.
And most of the homestead exemptions
allow tle debtor to mortgage the same
by the consent of the wife, which could
not be done if the law held it sacred for
the support of the family. And the defence of the Statute of Limitations or
a discharge in bankruptcy, and all similar defences, may be waived by a new
promise. Unless the decision can be
supported upon some principle distinct
from thi. it is clearly not maintainable.
But it seems to us that the decision is
nevertheless sound, and the only one
which

the law should sanction.

We

think this kinl of executory contract, by
which the debtor is made to promise in
advance that he will not exercise his
legal rights in regard to the collection
of a particular debt, where he cannot
possibly form any just opinion how he
will be situated when the time arrives
for the exercise of such rights, must be
regarded as made under a species of duress ; for if one mode of escaping from
the payment of a debt may be effectually
surrendered in this mode, so may any
other privilege which the law allows
honest but unfortunate poor debtors.
He may with equal propriety waive the
benefit of the poor debtor's oath, or
obtaining or claiming the benefit of a
discharge in bankruptcy or insolvency,
or even defending the claim when sued,
which, no doubt he may do, when the
time arrives, but can he do it in advance ?
In short, the upholding of such contracts will be to allow creditors to virtually enslave their debtors, and this
the law of course will never favor. The
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question of the validity of this contract
is much like many others which the law
will not allow creditors and debtors to
make. Thus it has been long settled
that the debtor cannot by any form of
contract bind himself to waive or release
in futuro any equity of redemption he
may have in mortgaged premises, after
failure to pay the mortgage-debt at the
time it falls due, which he may clearly
do after the equity accrues. And the same
is true in regard to the payment of usurious interest, and in regard to the sale of
expectancies by heirs at law. And there
are some other instances where the law
refuses to uphold the contract between
debtor and creditor on the ground *ofthe
unequal circumstances in which they
are placed and the great facility thereby
afforded for the creditor to gain an
unjust advantage over his oppressed
debtor. It seems to us that the contract
in the present case, whereby the debtor
agrees in advance to waive any exemption
of property from the payment of his debts
in fav6r of this particular creditor, must
be regarded as made by parties standing
in such unequal relations, and also that it
is of a character so liable to general
abuse by creditors, that it cannot properly be upheld by the courts. We have
not deemed it necessary to refer to any
decisions upon analogous subjects. The
principle is a very familiar one to the
profession, and the only difficulty is to
determine how far the present case comes
within it. If so, it was clearly well decided. The only question here is how
far the law will shield the debtor from
the effect of a contract, in advance, to
waive his legal rights, when they shall
accrue. One may give his creditor a
power to enter up judgment on his claim,
at any specified time, and some will regard this contract as of that nature.
An agreement not to move to set aside
the execution would seem somewhat difI. F. R.
ferent.

LANGABER .v. FAIRBURY, &a., RAILROAD -CO.

supreme Court of Illinois.
LANGABER v. FAIRBURY, &c., R. R. CO.
Although Sunday is dies non juridicus at the common law, and although the
statute of Illinois prohibits all secular employment on that day, yet in special cases
where public policy or the prevention of irremediable wrong requires it, the courts
may sit on that day and issue process.
An injunction issued on Sunday to prevent a railroad company from taking
pos-ession of a public street in a town, without having made compensation to
property-owners who would be injured thereby, sustained.

Tnis was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Livingston county, dissolving an injunction and dismissing a bill in
equity. The facts appear in the opinion.
A. E. Harding,for appellant.
Ingersoll, Payson and N. J. Pillsbury, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREESE, C. J.-This is a bill in chancery praying for a writ
of injunction to restrain the Fairbury, Pontiac and North Western
Railway Company from taking possession of one of the principal
streets (Walnut), in the incorporated town of Fairbury, for the
purpose of grading, tying and ironing the same for the track of
their railroad. The bill is filed by a large property-owner on the
street to be taken by the railway, and it alleges that the company,
immediately after twelve o'clock of the night of Saturday, with a
large force of men had taken violent, possession of the street, for
the express and avowed purpose of finishing their track through
its entire length before the next Monday morning, and that they
had selected Sunday for the work for the express purpose of
evading an injunction, and avoiding the process of court, and for
the purpose of obtaining and holding the street without paying for
it, or the damages thereby occasioned to the property-owners upon
it. That the company has not paid or offered to pay anything to
any person injured by the proposed occupancy of that street, nuir
taken any steps or measures to estimate the damages, or have th'e
same assessed in pursuance of law. It is also alleged the companY
is wholly insolvent, and if it is permitted to take possession, co,,trol
and use that street for the purpose of operating its trains over
the same. without paying complainant the damages he will sustain
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in consequence thereof, he will be without remedy in the premises,
and will absolutely lose at least one-half the value of his property
in consequence thereof, and that the grading for railway purposes
will greatly injure the street and complainant's property, and
unless the company, the contractors, and their agents and servants
are restrained by injunction issued forthwith, the road will he
finished through the street to-day, Sunday, and that the company
and its contractors are doing the work on this day, Sunday, in
order to avoid paying complainant his damages, and to defraud
him out of the same, which they will accomplish successfully
unless immediately enjoined by process of the court.
This bill was presented to the master in chancery in the absence
of the Circuit Judge on Sunday; the writ of injunction was ordered
by the master on that day, and issued by the clerk, and served by
the sheriff on the same day. At the September Term following, a
motion was made to quash the writ, which was allowed and the
bill dismissed.
Complainant brings the record here by writ of error, and
assigns this action of the court as error. The bill on its face
presents strong grounds for the interference of a court of chancery,
and justifies the ordering and issuing of a writ of injunction.
But the defendant insists if this be so, no valid writ could issue
on Sunday. He insists that the order of the master in chancery
being made on Sunday was void, for the reason that it was a
judicial act, and Sunday is not a judicial day.
As a general proposition it may be conceded Sunday is not a
day in law for proceedings, contract, &c.: 2 Inst. 264. Anciently,
however, courts of justice did sit on Sunday. The early Christians of the sixth century, and before, used all days alike for
hearing of causes, not sparing the Sunday itself; but in the year
517, a canon was promulgated exempting Sundays. Other canons
were adopted in subsequent years, exempting other days, which
were all revised and adopted by the Saxon kings, and all confirmed by William the Conqueror and Henry the Second, and
in that way became a part of the common law of England:
Swann v. Broome, 3 Burr. 1595. By the canons of the church
Sunday was decreed dies non juridicus, and by the same canons
other days were declared unjuridical, as the day of the Purification
of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the feast of the Ascension, the feast
of St. John the Baptist, and All Saints and All Souls days.
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These were as much unjuridical days as Sunday, yet the most
devoted admirer of the common law would not hesitate to say that
the proceedings of a court of justice in this state on either of those
days would be valid. Yet by the common law no valid judicial
act could be performed on either of those days. Why, then, if
such an act can be .done and have binding force on these unjudicial
days in this state, should not equal efficacy be accorded to the
same act if done on the other unjudicial (lay, viz. : Sunday? It
is answered that secular employment of any kind is prohibited by
our criminal code, and reference is made to section 144.
We had occasion, in Johnson v. The People, 31 Ill. 469, to
express briefly our views of this question, the case being one where
a recognisance had been taken by a nagistrate on Sunday, from
which the cognisor sought to be discharged, on the ground that
having been taken on Sunday, and being a judicial act, it was
void and of no effect. This court said, generally judicial acts
cannot be performed on Sunday, but the recognisance was held to
be valid and no violation of the section referred to. That we
were to understand by the word "necessity" not a physical and
absolute necessity, but the moral fitness or propriety of the work
done under the circumstances of each particular case ; that any
work, therefore, necessary to be done to secure the public safety
by the safe-keeping of a felon, or delivering him to bail, must
come within the true meaning of the exception in the statute; that
neither the peace or good order of society was disturbed by such a
proceeding, as it may be, and usually is, silently conducted. The
'notion that Sunday is a day so sacred that no judicial act can be
performed, had its origin with ecclesiastics of an unenlightened
age, and rests upon no substantial basis; and if it is the doctrine
of the common law, it need not have application here, in this day
of thought and increased enlightenment. Men are freer now than
then, and are permitted to regard acts as innocent and harmless
which were then deemed sacrilegious and worthy of anathema. So
long as our own statute is not violated, so long as nothing is done
which it forbids, there can be no reasonable ground for complaint.
There is nothing in our constitution of government inhibiting
the General Assembly from declaring Sunday to be dies juridicus.
One step has been taken in that direction, by providing, by law,
as follows : On proof being made before any judge or justice of
the peace, or clerk of the Circuit Court within this state, that a
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debtor is actually absconding or concealed, or stands in defiance
of an officer duly authorized to. arrest him on civil process, or has
departed this state with the intention of having his effects and
personal estate removed out of the state, or intends to depart with
sutch intentioh, it shall be lawful for the clerk to issue and the
sheriff or other officer to serve an. attachment against such debtor
on a Sunday or any other day, as is directed in this chapter: R.
S. 184.5, ch. 9, sect. 27.
Here "this. dies non juridicuswas selected by the railroad compa',y as the. proper day to commit a great outrage. upon private
and public rights, believing that .the arm of the law could not
-be extended on that day t6 arrest them in their high-handed
and unlawful design. To.the complainants, the acts they were
organized to perpetrate on that day, we re fraught with irrepa.rable injury. Feeble inideed would be the judicial.arm if it could
not reach such• miscreants. To, save a debt -of twenty dollars,
judicial aots ,can be performed on Sunday, and-ministerial as-well.
To prevent the ruin of-an individual such an -act must not be done.
34ame and impotent conclusion. In Comyn's Digest, title "Temp.-'
u;ider the head.diesnon juridicus, it is said the Chancery is always
open. So the -Exchequer maysit upon a Sunday, or out of term:
p. 883 (c. 6i). There- is.nothing, to an ixtelligent mind, revolting
inthis., Suppose, in times of high political excitement, a citizen
is indicted for treason, nsd judgment of death pronounced against
him by a servile-judge; who, not a--slave of the crown, as were
Trevelyan, ScrQgga and. Jeffries, but yet the slave of an enraged
populace, on an' indictment never; returned into court or found by
a gratnd jury,t and defective iri- ,every. essential, and this judgment
pronounced.on Sgturday, and the time of, his execution fixed- on
the.following Mondoy. . To -arrest this proposed judicial. murder
an application is made to a mnember of the appellate court on the
intervening Sabbath ;,-who. would justify !the judge should he fold
hi arms,- and on the -plea the day was. not a judicial day, suffer
the victim to be led, to execution? The necessity of the case
would be the law of the case. The.judge" who has no respect for
this principle is unworthy the ermine, and an unfit -conservator.of
the xights of the citizen, The cse before us is not one of life or
death, but invblves irreparable injury to property. An imperious
iecessity demanded the prompt interposition of chancery. ,On-
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that principle the act is fully justified. This is the dictate of
right, of reason, of common justice and common sense.
The decree of the court below, quashing the writ of injunction
and dismissing the bill, is reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings.
Dies doyninicus non e-st jaridicus is the
undisputed maxim of the common law:
S uan v. Brome, 3 Burrow 1595. On
the other hand there is high authority
for the position that all acts of a nonjudicial nature, including contracts, are
equally valid at all times, unless forbidden by express statute: Mackalley's
Case, 9 Rep. 66 b ; Walite v. Hundred of
Stoke, Cro. Jac. 496 ; Story v. Elliott,
8 Cowen 27 ; Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts
231 ; .fohnson v. Day, 17 Pick. 106;
Bloom v. Richards, 3 Ohio St. 387. In
the case before us it is admitted as a
general proposition that Sunday is not
a judicial day, and that judicial acts
performed at that time are therefore
void. But it is further said: "The
notion that Sunday is a day so sacred
that no judicial act can be performed
* * * rests upon no substanti'al basis."
And the conclusion is finally reached
that a judicial act upon a non-judicial
day is fully justified when demanded by
an imperious necessity. "The necessity
case would be the law of the
of tile
case." In Swan v. Broome (supira), it
was determined that if a writ of summinow; in common recovery be returned

on Sunday and vouchec dies on that day,
the recovery is bad. MANSFIELD expressing regret at being obliged to reverse a common recovery upon such an
objection, and declaring that he had
struggled hard to find legal means by
which it could be supported.
The authorities are conflicting as to
whether the verdict of a jury falls within
the prohibition of the common law. It
certainly presents an anomalous case,
and there seems to be much force in the
argument that to deny a jury the privi-

lege of sealing a verdict and departing
to their homes upon a Sunday, is in
effect, as far as those twelve men arp
concerned and their legal custodians, to
defeat the purpose of the law, and needlessly to deprive them of the religious
and social advantages of the day: IDuidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts 59 ; Hiller v.
English, 4 Strob. 486; True v. Plundey,
36 Me. 466 ; Baxter v. The People, 3
Gil. (I1.) 384. Contra, Daris v. Fish, 1
Greene (Iowa) 406; Shaw v. XcConibs,
2 Bay 232.
Again, there are contradictory opinions
as to the validity of an award rendered
after the Sabbath had set in. III Story
v. Elliot, 8 Cowen 27, it was held to be
a judicial act, and of a consequence
void. But in Sargeant v. Butts, 21 Ver-,
mont 99, an award was sustained which
had been determined after Satiriay night
had faided into Sunday morning. In all
these cases it would appear the consideration of the verdict or deliberation
upon the award had begun prior to the
coming of the Sabbath.
In Johnson v. The People, 31 Ill. 473,
the court whose decision we are now
considering, and speaking by the same
judge, held a recognisance entered into
upon a Sunday legal, as it wanted nearly
all the requi-ites of a judicial proccc,ing, and was justified by a lawful necessity.
Tile conclusion in the present case
goes to the length that an act eminently
judicial in its nature, will be fully justified even upon a Sunday, when impelled by overruling necessity. This determination seems to have been reached
without, the aid of any direct authority
or.special statute, and by a course of

BELL v. THE STATE.
reasoning that can scarcely be said to be
entirely beyond criticism. Even though
it be admitted that the common-law rules
in relation to non-judicial days are
founded upon ancient canons of the
church, yet the argument certainly proves
too much when it is urged that the Christian Sunday and the forgotten feast days
of the church stand upon an equal footing,
else why justify the act upon the ground
of necessity ? The court further asserts,
however, that if it controverts the common law, the rule of that system need
have no application. "1So long as our
own statute," it says, ,"is not violated,
so long as nothing is done which it forbids, there can be no reasonable ground
for complaint." In answer to this it
can only be said that the common law
of England has been adopted by express
statute, "so far as the same is applicable
and of a general nature, and all statutes
or acts of the British Parliament made
in aid of and to supply the defects of
the common law, prior to the 4th year
of James the First," are made a rule
of decision, and declared to be of full
force until repealed by legislative anthority : Gross's Dig. R. S. of Ill. 416,
sec. 1.
7
ePeole, 3 Gil.
And in Baxter v.
384, it was laid down: '"That
(Ill.)
courts have no right to pronounce a judgment, or do any other act strictly judicial on. Sunday, unless expressly au-

thorized by statute, seems to be too well
settled to admit of a doubt by the decisions in England and in this country."
The attempt is made to cover the exception by a statute authorizing certain proceedings in exceptional cases; but assuredly that statute did not embrace the
exception in terms, and being in derogation of the common law was too inelastic to extend to the case by any judicial stretching. The facts as stated
present a case of great hardship, but can
it be said the remedy alone was to be
found in disregarding the established
rule of the common lawI There was
a statute rendering all servile labor
criminal upon that day-as soon as a
laborer raised his pick he had become
amenablelto the police, and could have
been immediately deprived of his liberty,
and rendered secure from further violation of the law.
Questions of practical difficulty present themIselves under the rule laid down
in this case. Whether the special observance of Sunday be a divine or merely
human institution, the reason of the common-law maxim remains the same; it
was intended thereby that the judges
of the courts should be freed from their
duties upon this day at least, and be at
liberty to enjoy uninterruptedly the comforts of theirhomes and the consolations
of their religion: Broom's Leg. Max.
J. P. B.
*22.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
BELL AND
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An an indictment framed under 3695 of the Revised Code of Alabama, a count
which charges that the defendants "broke into and entered" a certain described
bu;lding of the class included in that section, "and feloniously took atd carried
i.way certain enumerated articles of personal property of a specified third person,
is a count for grand larceny only. To constitute a good count for burglary there
must be an averment that the breaking and entry were " with intent to steal or to
commit a felony."
A count charging that the defendants "broke into aind entered "1 a certain
building -therein .described, of the class included in 1 3695 of the Revised Code,
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"with the intent to steal," charges burglary only. There can be no conviction
of grand larceny under such a count.
Under a count charging that the defendants IIbroke into and entered a building
which it describes, of the class included in ? 3695 of the Revised Code, " with
the intent to steal, and feloniously took and carried iway" certain enumerated
articles of personal property of a specified third person, "of the value of more
than one hundred dollars," there may he a conviction of either or both of the
offences charged.
Burglary and grand larceny being under the provisions of the Revised Code,
istinct felonies of the same grade and subject to the same nature of punishment
are not governed by the doctrine of merger.
When there is a conviction of both burglary and larceny, charged in the same
count, but one punishment should be awarded.
A verdict finding the defendants guilty of burglary on the trial of an indictment, charging in separate counts both burglary and grand larceny, is tantamount
to an acquittal of the grand larceny, and thereafter expunges that charie from the
indictment.
An acquittal thus obtained is final, and cannot be impaired by a judgment rendered by an appellate court, on defendants' appeal, reversing the conviction for
burglary and remanding the cause for further proceedings.
An acquittal of grand larceny, resulting from proceedings on the first trial,
being final, takes away any legal foundation for a verdict on the second trial,
finding the defendants guilty of grand larceny. Such a verdict is a nullity.
The rendition by the jury of a void verdict is no legal ground for discharging
them from their deliberations. The discharge of a jury, without the consent of
the defendants, for no other reason than the rendition of a voil verdict, is tantamount to an acquittal of all the charges upon which the jury were prevented from
passing by their discharge.
The defendants in the case at bar having been acquitted of grand larceny on
the first trial, and the court having discharged the jury on the second trial, without
the consent of defendants, for no other legal reason than the rendition of a void
verdict, whereby the jury were prevented from passing on the charge of burglary,
the only one remaining in the indictment, it was held that the whole case was
thereby ended, and the court below having refused to discharge the defendants,
tle Supreme Court on their appeal, reversed the judgment and sentence of the
court below, and ordered their discharge.

from the City Court of Montgomery.
The indictment originally contained four counts. On the first
count there was an entry of nolle pros. The second, charged that
the defendants "broke into and entered" a building, the ownership
and description of which were properly alleged, in which goods, &c.,
were at the time kept for use, &c., "with intent to steal." The third
count charged that the defendants "broke into and entered a building, described as in the second count, in which goods, &c., were at
the time kept, &c., and feloniously took and carried away certain
specified articles of personal property of a specified third person,
"of the value of more than one hundred dollars."
The fourth
APPEAL
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count charged that the defendants "broke into and entered" a
building described as in the second count, in which goods, &c.
were at the time kept for use, &c., "with the intent to steal, and
feloniously took and carried away" certain specified articles of
personal property of a specified third person "of the value of more
than one hundred dollars."
At the spring term 1878 of the City Court the defendants interposed a demurrer to the indictment, which was overruled. They
then went to trial on plea of not guilty. The state proved the
burglary laid in the indictment, and connected the defendants with
it by offering evidence of recent and unexplained possession by
them of the articles of personal property stolen from the house at
the time it was broken and entered. The defendants coffered no
evidence. The jury returned a verdict as follows: "We the jury
find the defendants guilty of burglary," and the court thereupon
sentenced the defendants to specified terms of imprisonment in the
penitentiary
At the June Term 1873 of the Supreme Court, on defendants'
appeal, "the judgment and sentence" of the City Court were "reversed and annulled," and the "cause remanded for further proceedings therein," on the ground that the court below erred in not
allowing the defendants peremptory challenge to a juror as to whom
they had inadvertently announced themselves satisfied, but which
announcement was withdrawn and offer to challenge made, before
the juror was sworn in chief.
At the Spring Term 1874 of the City Court the defendants were
again arraigned, when they pleaded former acquittal as to each and
every charge of larceny contained in the indictment and the several counts thereof. This plea was based on the proceedings had
on the formal trial, which were incorporated in the plea by proper
averments, showing the identity of the offences, of defendants, &c.
The court sustained a demurrer to this plea, and thereupon the
defendants went to trial on plea of not guilty. The state, with the
consent of the accused, offered in evidence the testimony introduced
by it on the first trial as set forth in the bill of exceptions then reserved by the appellants, and the defendants introduced no evidence
whatever.
The jury rendered the following verdict:"We the jury find the defendants guilty of grand larceny, as
charged in the indictment, and recommend them to the mercy of
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the court."

On the rendition of this verdict the jury was dis-

charged, and the defendants remanded to jail to await sentence.

At a subsequent day of the term, on being asked why judgment
should not be awarded against them, the defendants moved in
arrest of judgment, on the ground that records of the court, in this
very cause, showed that at a former term the defendants had been
acquitted of the identical offences of which the jury had convicted
them on the last trial. They also moved to be discharged on the
ground that the verdict rendered by the jury on the first trial

operatedl as an acquittal of the charge of larceny, and that the
verdict of the jury convicting the defendants of larceny and the
discharge of the jury on the second trial, was tantamount to an
acquittal of the burglary charged, whereby the whole -indictment
was disposed of.
The court overruled both of these motions, and sentenced the
defendants in accordance with the verdict of the jury on the last
trial. The defendants appealed to the court."

Thomas G. Jones and J. M. Falkner,for appellants.
The Attorney-aeneraland Sayre & Graves, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-A paradox is a proposition seemingly absurd,

BRICKELL,

yet true in fact. An instance is that under the constitution and
laws of Alabama and under an indictment charging the defendants
with two distinct felonies, two verdicts rendered at different terms
of the primary court, the first expressly finding them guilty of one
of the felonies, the second expressly finding them guilty of the

IUnder the Code of Alabama all offences punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary, are made felonies without regard to the length of imprisonment prescribed. When offences are of the same character and subject to the same punishment, the defendant may be charged with either In the same count in the alternative. The stealing of the personal property of another, when the value of the
stolen property exceeds one hundred dollars, is grand larceny, and punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary or hard labor for the county for not less than five
years. Burglary is committed when any person CCeither in the night or daytime,
with intent to steal or to commit a felony, breaks into and enters any dwellinghouse, * * *; or into any shop * * * or other building in which any goods,
merchandise or other valuble thing is kept for use, sale or deposit," and is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or hard labor for the county for not
less than two nor more than twenty years.
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other, may, when accompanied by an unauthorized discharge of the
second jury, amount to an acquittal and operate as such.
Section 9 of Article 1 of our state constitution provides, "that
no person shall be accused, arrested or detained, except in cases
ascertained by law, and according to the forms which the same
has prescribed; and that no person shall be punished but by virtue
of a law established and promulgated, prior to the offence, and
legally applied.
Section 2 of Article 6 of that constitution is in the following
words : "Except in cases otherwise directed in the constitution, the
*Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall
be coextensive with the state, under such restrictions and regulations, not repugnant to this constitution, as may from time to time
be prescribed by law."
The restrictions and regulations as to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in criminal cases, have been prescribed by
.law and are contained in Chapter XII., Title 3, Part IV., embracing
sections 4302 to 4316 inclusive, of the Revised Code of Alabama.
Section 4302 declares that "any question in law arising in any of
the proceedings in a criminal case tried in the Circuit or-City
Court may be reserved by the defendants, but not by the state, for
the consideration of the Supreme Court, and if the question does
not distinctly appear on the record, it must be reserved by bill of
exceptions duly taken and signed by the presiding judge as in civil
cases." By the sections of the Code above recited, the defendant
in any criminal case, but not the state, "may take the case to the
Supreme Court by appeal or writ of error; and in any case taken
to the Supreme Court under the provisions of said chapter, no assignment of error, or joinder in errors, is necessary; but the court
must render such judgment as the law demands ;" and if it reverses the judgment of the primary court, may order a new trial,
or the discharge of the defendant, "or make such other order as the
case may require:" Rev. Code 4314.
In the language of Chief Justice GIBSON, "Our jurisprudence
abounds with unreasonable advantages enjoyed by the accused.
The least slip in the indictment is fatal; a new trial cannot be
awarded after an acquittalproduced by the most glaring misdirection; and the prisoner is to be acquitted whenever there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt. These and many other unreasonable advantages, the law allows on principles of humanity or policy."
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* * * * * "But feeling as I do, a horror of judicial legislation,
I would suffer any extremity of inconvenience, rather than step
beyond the legitimate province of the court, to touch even a hair
of any privilege of a prisoner," &c. &c.: Com. v. Lesher, 17 S. &
R. 164.
The indictment here to be considered was found at the February
Term 1873, of the City Court of Montgomery, and consists of four
counts. The first count was nol pros'd. The second charges that
the defendants "broke into and entered a building" described in
that count, "with the intent to steal." The third count charges
that the defendants "broke into and entered a building" described
as in the second count, "and feloniously took and carried away"
certain specified articles of personal property of a specified third
person, " of the value of more than one hundred dollars."
This third count contains no averment as to the intent with
which the defendants "broke into and entered" the building.
The fourth count charges that the defendants "broke into and
entered a building" described as in the second and third counts,
"with the intent to steal, and feloniously took and carried away"
personal property, as described in the third count, "of the value of
more than one hundred dollars."
Under section 3695 of our Revised Code, which defines burglary
differently from the common law, the second count is a count for
burglary only, and does not include nor authorize a conviction
for the offence of grand larceny: Fieher v. The State, 46 Ala."
720.
Under the definition of burglary contained in that section of the
Code, the third count is not a count for burglary, because it con-.
tains no averment that the defendants broke into and entered the
building "with intent to steal or to commit a felony." An averment of the existence of the "intent to 8teal or to commit afelony,"
at the time they broke into and entered the building, was essential
to make that count a good one for burglary: Oliver v. The State,
17 Ala. 587; Ogletree v. The State, 28 Ala. 693; Moore v. Cornuzonwealth, 6 Mete. 243. As that count did not contain such
averment, it is a count for grand larceny only. The fourth count
is a count for burglary and grand larceny, and under it, the defendants might on the first trial have been convicted of either or of
both of these offences. But if they had been convicted of both,
under that count, there could have been but one penalty ; because,
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in that event, the merciful and just construction in favor of the
defendants would have been that as both offences were charged in
the same count, they should be deemed as " one continued act," for
which but one penalty could be adjudged: JosslZyn v. Commonwealth, 6 Mete. 236.
Under our Code, burglary and grand larceny are distinct felonies
of the same grade, subject to the nature of punishment, and may
be joined in the same indictment, but are not subject to the doctrine of merger: Johnson v. The State, 29 Ala. 62; Hamilton v.
The State, 36 Ind. 286; Wilson v. The State, 37 Ala. 184; 1 Whar.
Am. Crim. Law, § 564.
When the defendants were put on trial under this indictment,
at the February Term 1873, of the City Court of Montgomery,
and evidence as to their guilt was submitted to the jury, they wei
in jeopardy both as to burglary and larceny, and might have been
convicted and punished for both under the distinct counts of the
indictment: Josslyn v. Commonwealth, 6 Mete. 236. If on
that trial the verdict of the jury had been "we the jury find the
defendants guilty as charged in the indictment," or "we the jury
find the defendants guilty of burglary and grand larceny as charged
in the distinct counts of the indictment," they certainly could have
been tried again for both burglary and grand larceny, after they
had brought the case to this court and procured a reversal of the
judgment of the City Court.
But on that trial, the verdict was, " we the jury find the defendants Richard Bell and George Murray guilty of burglary." That
verdict was received by the City Court.and judgment and sentence
thereon rendered by that court against the defendants, to the effect
that each of them be confined in the penitentiary for specified
periods. The defendants'thereupon took the case to the Supreme
Court under the provisions of the Code above cited. And at the
June Term 1873, this court reversed the said "judgment and sentence" of the City Court, and remanded the case to that court "for
further proceedings."
As the indictment was for burglary and grand larceny, and the
verdict was only for burglary, the necessary intendment of the
finding was that the defendants were not guilty of the alleged larceny. "As to all which -is not found, the conclusion must be that
the jury intended to acquit :" Nancy v. The State, 6 Ala. 483;
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.ANbon v. The State, 6 Ala. 200; Burns v. The State, 8 Ala. 313.
Plartin f Flinnv. The State, 28 Ala. 72.
The legal effect of that verdict of acquittal of larceny, whether
any judgmenit was rendered on it or not, was to put the alleged
larceny as completely out of the indictment and case as if it had
never been in the indictment and ca.ze: Mount v. The State, 14
Ohio 295; Shepherd -v. The People, 24 New York 406; State v.
M21artin, 30 Wisconsin 223; People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376 ; Hurt
v. The State, 25 Mis.issippi 378; Campbell v. The State, 9
Yerger 333; State v. Ross, 29 Missouri 32; Jones v. The State,
1:3 Texas 168; ilforri3s v. The State, 8 Smedes & Marshall 762;
1 Bish. Crim. Law (ed. of 1856) § 676.
The ea-e, when brought by the defendants to the court, at its
June Term 1873, had, by the aforesaid proceedings in the C:ty
Court, become a case for burglary only. This court was bound to
treat it as such ; and in reversing the judgment and sentence of
the City Court, at the instance of the defendants, the Supreme
Court hail no jurisdiction to deprive them of the advantages which
the law gave them as the result of the final verdict. The jurisdiction of this court, in the case as brought, was appellate only.
As the case when brought here had become one for burglary only,
it xemained a case for burglary only when remanded to the City
Court.
After the case was thus remanded, the City Court in effect required the defendants not only to be tried for the alleged burglary,
but again to be put in jeopardy for the alleged larceny of which
they had been acquitted as aforesaid. They were'put on trial for
both burglary and grand larceny, precisely as if there had been no
former trial and no former verdict. On this trial, at the February
Term 1874 of the City Court, the same evidence which had been
adduced on the former trial was introduced, but the verdict was,
"we, the jury, find the defendants guilty of grand larceny as
charged in the indictment, and recommend them to the mercy of
the court." The City Court received this verdict, remanded the
defendant-; to jail to await sentence, and discharged the jury. No
consent of the defendants to this discharge of the jury appears,
and such consent cannot be presumed.
If this last verdict were of any validity, its undoubted effect and
meaning in law would be that the jury found the defendants not
guilty of burglary. -But that verdict is a mere nullity, because

BELL v. THE STATE.

the charge of grand larceny had been put out of the case by the
verdict and Droceedings on the former trial: FTiher v. The State,
46 Ala. 721
A verdict which is a mere nullity, is no legal reason for the discharge of the jury. And when, as here, that is the only reason
for the discharge of the jury, and there is no evidence that the
defendants consented to such discharge, the legal effect of such
discharge is the acquittal and discharge of the defendants from
any further prosecution for the offence or offences set forth on the
indictment: Ex. parte Vincent, 43 Ala. 402; McCauley v. The
State, 26 Ala. 135.
It is not the verdict finding the defendants guilty of grand larceny orn the last trial which acquits them of burglary. At the
time of that trial there remained, in law, no such charge as grant.
larceny in the indictment. That which acquits the defendants on
the last trial is not the void verdict, but the discharge of the jury,
charged with the trial of defendants for burglary, without necessity
and without their consent. The void verdict had no effect. The
jury should have-been instructed to return to their deliberations.
As the jury was not so instructed, but was discharged without a
verdict on the only charge which by law it was authorized to consider, and' without consent of defendants, that dispersion of the
jury operated as an acquittal. So, on the first trial, when defendants
were in jeopardy for both burglary and grand larceny, the discharge
of the jury, without rendering a verdict as to larceny and without
the consent of the defendants (although they rendered a verdict
as to burglary), operated as an acquittal of the larceny. This is one
of the strongest and most logical reasons for the rule that where
defendants are put on trial on several counts and the jury find
only as to one, the defendants are thereby acquitted as to the others.
It is a settled rule in this state, that the unauthorized discharge
of a jury, charged with the trial of a defendant in a criminal
case,°is tantamount to his acquittal of all the alleged offences upon
which the jury did not expressly pass, or were prevented from
.-passing by the unwarranted discharge. From this rule it follows
that where two charges are contained in the indictment, and on
the first trial there was a discharge of the jury, without necessity
and without the consent of the defendants, before the jury had
passed and whereby they were prevented from passing on the first
offence, that discharge is tantamount to an acquittal of the offences
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not passed on. If on the second trial, the jury, which then, in law,
are charged to inquire into the second offence only, are discharged
without necessity and without defendants' consent, that discharge
operates an acquittal of the second and only remaining offence,
whereby the defendants are freed from 'the whole charge.
Strictly speaking, then, it is not the two verdicts against the
defenlants in the present case but the unwarrantable discharge of
the jury in the last trial as shown by the record.
We have been aided in our investigation of this case and the
important and delicate questions it involves by the elaborate and
exhaustive briefs of the counsel for the appellants, creditable alike
to their inlustry and discrimination. To them we refer as containg the citation of many authorities, not cited in this opinion,
sustaining the conclusions we have reached.
The judgment of the City Court is reversed, and judgment must
be here rendered discharging the appellants.
SAFFOLD, J., being related to the prosecutor, declined to sit
although objection to -his competency was waived on the record.

United States Circuit Court, District of California.
IN THE MATTER OF AH FONG.
The police power of the state may be exercised by precautionary measures
igainst the increase of crime or pauperism, or the spread of infectious diseases
from persons coming from other countries. The state may entirely exclude convicts and persons afflicted with incurable disease ; may refuse admission to paupers,
idiots and lunatics and others, who from physical causes are likely to become a

charge upon the public until security is afforded that they will not become such a
charge; and may isolate the temporarily diseased until the danger of contagion is
gone.
The extent of the power of the state to exclude a foreigner from its territory is
limited by the right of self-defence. Whatever outside of the legitimate exercise
of this right affects the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration
to this country and residence therein, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
general government, and is not subject to state control or interference.
The 6th Article of the Treaty between the United States and China, adopted on
the 28th of July 1868, provides that Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the
United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect
to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation, and as the general government has not seen fit to attach any limitation to the ingress into the United States of subjects of those nations, none can
be applied to the subjects of China.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution declares that no state shall de-
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prive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ; nor deny
to any person the equal protection of the laws ; Held, that this equality of protection implies not only equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption with others
of the same class, from all charges and burdens of every kind. Within these
limits the power of the state exists, as it did previously to the adoption of the
amendment, over all matters of internal police.
On the 31st of May 1870, Congress passed an act declaring that "no tax or
charge shall be imposed or enfirced by any state upon any person immigrating
thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed or enforced upon every
person immigrating to such state from any other foreign country, and any law of
any state in conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void ;" Held,
1st. That the term charge, as here used, means any onerous condition, and ineludes a condition which makes the right of an immigrant, arriving in the ports of
the state, to land within the state depend upon the :execution of a bond by a third
party, not under his control, and whom he cannot constrain by any legal proceedings; and,
2. That the statute of California, which prohibits foreign immigrants of certain
classes, arriving in the state of California by vessel, from landing until a bond
shall have been given by the master, owner or consignee of the yessel that they
will not become a public charge, and imposes no condition upon immigrants of the
same class entering the state in any other way, is in conflict with the Act of Con.gress.
THE

petitioner sued out a writ of Aabea8 corpue alleging that

she was illegally restrained of her liberty by the Coroner of the
City and County of San Francisco, and asked to be discharged
from such restraint.

The facts were briefly as follows : The peti-

tioner is a subject of the Empire of China, and came to the port
of San Francisco as a passenger on board of the American steam-

ship Japan, owned by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, and
under the command as master, of J. H. Freeman. On the arrival
of the steamship at San Francisco she was boarded by the Commissioner of Immigration of California, who proceeded under the
provisions of a statute of the state, to examine into the character
of the petitioner and other alien passengers. Upon such examination, the commissioner found, and so declared, that the petitioner
and twenty-one other persons, also subjects of the Empire of China,
arriving as passengers by the same steamship, were lewd and debauchedwomen. .Hethereupon prohibited the master of the steamship from landing the women, unless he or the owner or consignee
of the vessel gave the bonds required by the statute. Neither of
the parties designated would consent to give the required bonds,
and the women were consequently detained by the master on board

of the steamship.

They thereupon applied for a writ of habea8
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corpus to a District Court of the state to inquire into the cause of
their detention, alleging in their petition its illegality, on the
ground that the statute, under which they were held, was in contravention of the treaty between the United States and the Empire
of China, and in conflict with the Constitution of the United States,
anl denying, also, that they were either lewd or debauched women..
The District Court granted the application, and heard the petitioners, and after the hearing, remanded them back to the charge
of the master of the steamship, holding that the statute of California was neither in violation of the treaty or the Constitution, and
that the evidence presented justified the finding of the commissioner, that the petitioners were lewd and debauched women. The
petitioners thereupon applied to the Chief Justice of the state for
another writ of habeas corpus, alleging the illegality of their restraint, on grounds similar to those taken in the petition to the
District Court, an'd also alleging that they were, since the order of
the District Court remanding them to the custody of the master
of the steamship, about to be forcibly returned to China against
their will and consent. They therefore prayed that with the writ
of habeas corpus a warrant might issue to the sheriff of the city
and county of San Francisco to take them into his custody. The
Chief Justice granted the writ, returnable before the Supreme
Court of the state, and at the same time issued a warrant commanding the coroner of the city and county to take the parties into his
custody, and bring them before the court.
Under this warrant the parties were taken into the custody of
the coroner, and in his custody they still remain. The Supreme
Court sustained the ruling of the District Court, and denied the
application of the parties to be discharged, holding, that the statute
of the state, under which they were detained, was valid and binding
under the treaty between the United States and China and the
Constitution of the United States, and that the evidence justified
the finding of the Commissioner of Immigration as to the character
of the women. It therefore made an order directing that the coroier return the parties to the master or owner or consignee of the *
steamship Japan, on board of the steamship, and requiring such
master, owner or consignee to retain the parties on board of the.
steamship until she should leave this port, and then to carry them
beyond the state.
The order further provided, that in case the steamship Japan
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was not in the port of San Francisco, the coroner should retain
the parties in his possession until the arrival in port of the steamship, and then enforce the order returning the parties to the vessel,
or retain the parties until the further direction of the court.
FIELD, J. (after stating the facts).-The petitioner is one of the
women held by the coroner, and she now invokes the aid of this
court to be released from her restraint, alleging, as in the other
applications, that the restraint is illegal, that the statute which is
supposed to authorize it is in contravention of the treaty with
China and the Constitution of the IJnited !States, and averring that
she is not within either of the classes designated in the statute.
It further appears, from the special traverse to the return of the
Coroner, and it is admitted by counsel, that since thejudgment
of the Supreme Court, the steamship Japan has sailed from the
port of San Francisco, and will not probably return under three
months, and that Freeman has been disch arged from the service of
the Steamship Company, and is no longer master of the Japan.
The decision of the District Court, and of the Supreme Court
of the state, although entitled to great respect and consideration
from the acknowledged ability and learning of their judges, is not
binding upon this court. The petitioner being an alien, and a subject of a country having treaty relations with the government of
the United States, has a right to invoke the aid of the Federal
tribunals for her protection, when her rights, guaranteed by the
treaty, or the Constitution, or any law of Congress, are in any
respect invaded ; and is, of course, entitled to a hearing upon any
allegation in proper form that her rights are thus invaded.
I proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the questions presented, notwithstanding the adjudications iof the state tribunals.
The statute of the state, under which the petitioner was restrained of her liberty on board of the steamship, is found in the
provisions of chapter 1, title 7, of the Political Code, as amended
by the last legislature. These provisions require the master of a
vessel arriving at any port of this state, ,bringing passengers from
any place out of the state, within twenty-four hours after its arrival,
to make a written report under oath to the Commissioner of Immigration at such port, stating, among other things, the name, place
of birth, last residence, age and occupation of all passengers who
are not citizens, and whether any of the passengers thus reported
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"are lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled or infirm, and
not accompanied by any relatives able to support them, or are
lewd or abandoned women." Then follow the special provisions
which have given rise to the present proceeding. They are contained in Section 2952 of the Code as amended. They require
the Commissioner of Immigration "to satisfy himself whether or
not any passenger who shall arrive in this state by vessels from
any foreign port or place (who is not a citizen of the United States),
is lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled or infirm, and is not
accompanied by relatives who are able and willing to support him,
or is likely to become permanently a public charge, or has been a
pauper in any other country, or is, from sickness or disease, existing either at the time of sailing from the port of departure, or at
the time' of his arrival in this state, a public charge, or likely to
become so, or is a convicted criminal, or a lewd or debauched
woman;" and then declare that 1 no person who shall belong to
either class, or who possesses any of the infirmities or vices specified herein, shall be permitted to land in this state, unless the
master, owner or consignee of said vessel shall give a joint and
several bond to the people of the state of California, in the penal
sum of five hundred dollars, in gold coin of the United States, conditioned to indemnify and save harmless every county, city and
county, town and city of this state, against all costs and expenses
which may be by them necessarily incurred for the relief, support,
medical care, or any expense whatever, resulting from the infirmities or vices herein referred to, of the persons named in said bonds,
within two years from the date of said bonds; * * * and if the
master, owner or consignee of said vessel shall fail or refuse to
execute the bond herein required to be executed, they are required
to retain such persons on board of said vessel until said vessel shall
leave the port, and then convey said passengers from this state;
and if said master, owner or consignee shall fail or refuse to perform the duty and service last herein enjoined, or shall permit said
passengers to escape from said vessel and land in this state, they
shall forfeit to the state the. sum of five hundred dollars, in gold
coin of the United States, for each passenger so escaped, to be recovered by suit at law."
The provisions of this section are of a very extraordinar)
character. They make no distinction between the deaf, the dumb,
the blind, the crippled and the infirm, who are poor and dependent,

IN THE MATTER OF AH FONG.

and those who are able to support themselves and are in possession
of wealth and all its appliances. If they are not accompanied by
relatives, both able and willing to support them, they are prohibited
from landing within the state, unless a specified bond is given, not
by them or such competent sureties as they may obtain, but by the
owner, master or consignee of the vessel. Neither do the pro,visions of the statute make any distinction between a present pauper and one who has been a pauper, but has ceased to be such.
If the emigrant has ever been ithin that unfortunate class, notwithstanding he may have at the time ample means at his command, he must obtain the designated bond or be excluded from
the state. They subject also to the same condition, and possible
exclusion, the passenger whose sickness or disease has been contracted on the passage, as well as the passenger who was sick or
diseased on his departure from the foreign port. It matters not
that the sickness may have been produced by exertions for the
safety of the ship or passengers, or by attentions to their wants or
health. If he is likely on his arrival to become a public charge,
he must obtain the bond designated, or be denied a landing within
the state. Nor does the statute make any distinction between the
criminal convicted for a misdemeanor, or a felony, or for an offence
malum in s, or one political in its character. The condemned
patriot, escaping from his prison and fleeing to our shores, stands
under the law upon the same footing with the common felon who
is a fugitive from justice. Nor is there any difference made between the woman, whose lewdness consists in private unlawful indulgence, and the woman who publicly prostitutes her person for
hire, or between the woman debauched by intemperance in food or
drink, or debauched by the loss of her chastity.
A statute thus sweeping in its terms, confounding by general
designation persons widely variant in character, is not entitled to
any very high consideration. If it can be sustained as the exercise of the police power of the state as to any persons brought
within any of the classes designated, it must be sustained as to all
the persons of such class. That is to say, if it can be sustained
when applied to the infirm, who is poor and dependent, when unaccompanied by his relatives able and willing to support him, it
must be sustained when' applied to the infirm, who is surrounded
by wealth and its attendants, if he is thus unaccompanied. If it
can be sustained when applied to a woman whose debauchery con-
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sists in the prostitution of her person, it must be sustained when
applied to a woman whose debauchery consists in her intemperance
in food and drink; and even when applied to the repentant magdalen, who has once yielded to temptation and lost her virtue.
The Commissioner of Immigration is not empowered to make any
distinction between persons of the same class; and there is nothing
on the face of the act which indicates that the legislature intended
that any distinction should be made.
It is undoubtedly true that the police power of the state extends
to all matters relating to the internal government of the state, and
the administratio~n of its laws, which have not been surrendered
to the General Government, and"embraces regulations affecting the
health, good order, morals, peace and safety of society. Under
this power all sorts of restrictions and burdens may be imposed,
having for their object the advancement of the welfare of the
people of the state, and when these are not in conflict with established principles, or any constitutional prohibition, their validity
cannot be questioned.
It is equally true that the police power of the state may be exercised by precautionary measures against the increase of crime or
pauperism, or the spread of infectious diseases from persons coming
from other countries; that the state may entirely exclude convicts,
lepers and persons afflicted with incurable disease; may refuse admission to paupers, idiots and lunatics and others, who from physical causes are likely to become a charge upon the public until security is afforded that they will not become such a charge; and
may isolate the temporarily diseased until the danger of contagion
is gone. The legality of precautionary measures of this kind has
never been doubted. The right of the state in this respect has its
foundation, as observed by Mr. Justice GRIER in the Pasenger
Cases, in the sacred law of self-defence, which no power granted to
Congress can restrain or annul.
But the extent of the power of the state to exclude a foreigner
from its territory is limited by the right in which it has its origin,
the right of self-defence. Whatever outside of the legitimate exercise of this right affects the intercourse of foreigners with our
people, their immigration to this c.ountry and residence therein,
is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the General Government,
and is not subject to state control or interference. To that government the treaty-making power is confided; also, the power to
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regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse
with them as well as traffic; also the power to prescribe the conditions of migration or importation of persons, and rules of naturalization; whilst the states are forbidden to enter into any treaty,
alliance or confederation with other nations.
I am aware that the right of the state to exclude from its limits
any persons, whom it may deem dangerous or injurious to the interests and welfare of its citizens, has been asserted by eminent
judges of the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Chief
Justice TANEY maintained the existence of this right in his dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, and asserted that tho power
had been recognised in previous decisions of the court. The language of the opinion in the case of the City of New York v. Hiln.
11 Peters 141, would seem to sustain this doctrine. But neither
in the Passenger Cases nor in the case of the City of New York v.
.Miln, did the decision of the court require any consideration of the
power of exclusion, which the state possessed; and all that was
said by the eminent judges in those cases upon that subject, was
argumentative and not necessary and authoritative.'
t

The only point involved and decided in the case of the City of New York v.
Miln, 11 Pet. 102, was the constitutional power of the state of New York to compel the master of a vessel with passengers, arriving at her ports, from any country
out of the United States, or from any other state of the United States, to report in
writing, on oath, to the state authorities, under a prescribed penalty, the name,
place of birth and last legal settlement, age and occupation of every person brought
as a passenger in the vessel. This the Supreme Court held that the state, in
virtue of her general police powers, had the constitutional right to do. In the
course of the opinions of Mr. Justice BARBouR and !Mr. Justice THomrsow, general language is used indicatiug a power in the state to exclude persons from her
limits whom she might deem dangerous to the material or moral welfare of the
state, but the language was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the only point
then in judgment before the court.
The facts of the two cases known as the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, were
briefly these: One of the cases (Smith v. Turner) went to the Supreme Court, on
a writ of error from the Court of Errors of New York. The other case(Morris
v. The City of Boston) went to the Supreme Court of the United States from the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. The New York case arose substantially upon
thp.se facts:
A statute of that state authorized the Health Commissioner to demand and receive, and in case of neglect or refusal to pay, to sue for and recover f.om the
master of every vessel arriving in the port of New York from a foreign port, for
himself and each cabin passenger, one dollar and fifty cents, and from the master
of each coasting vessel for each person qn board twenty-five cents ; but coasting
vessels from New Jersey, Connecticut and Rhole Island, were only required to
pay for one voyage in each month.
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But independent of this consideration, we cannot shut our eyes
to the fact that much which was formerly said upon the power of
The moneys thus collected were denominated in the statute hospital-moneys,
and the master was authorized to sue and recover from each passenger the amount
poid on his account. To the failure on the part of the master to pay within twentyfour hours after arrival of the vessel, was attached a penalty of one hundred dollars.
All moneys collected from this source in excess of the amount necessary to defray
the hospital expenses, were to be paid over to the Treasurer of the Society for the
Reformation of Juvenille Delinquents, in the city of New York.
Upon this statute, Smith, the master of the British ship Henry Bliss, was sued
for $295. He demurred toLthe complaint, on the ground that so much of the statute as authorized a recovery was repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States. The demurrer was overruled in the state courts, and electing to stand upon
his demurrer, the case was taken to the Supreme Court bf the United States, where
the point was thus sharply presented to the court for decision. That tribunal, after
the most exhaustive and elaborate arguments upon the question, decided that the
Act of the Legislature of New York, in the particular case under consideration,
was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void, and accordingly
reversed the judgment of the Court of Errors of New York.
In the case of Norris ,. TAe City of Boston, the facts were substantially as
follows: Norris, an inhabitant of St. Johns, in the province of New Brunswick, kingdom of Great Britain, was master of a vessel belonging to the port of
St. Johns; he arrived with nineteen alien passengers at the port of Boston ;
prior to landing, he was compelled to pay under a law of Massachusetts, to the
city of Boston, two dollars for each passenger.
The statute of Massachusetts authorized the municipal authorities to appoint
examiners, whose duty it was to examine the condition of all passengers on board
of any vessel arriving in port. If, upon such examination, there were found
among said passengers "any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged or infirm person," incompetent in the opinion of the examining officer, to maintain himself, or ,vho
had been a pauper in another country, the passenger was not permitted to land
until the master, owner, consignee or agent of the vessel gave to the city a bond
in the sum of one thousand dollars, with sufficient sureties, that such lunatic or
indigent passenger would not become a citv, town or state charge within ten years
from the date of the bond, and for all alien passengers, other than those already
specified, the master was required to pay two dollars for each passenger before
they could land. Appropriate penalties were contained in the statute to secure
compliance with its terms. Norris paid the two dollars for each passenger, as
prescribed by the statute, under protest, landed his passengers, and thereupon instituted suit for the recovery of the money he had thus been compelled to pay. In
the state courts judgment passed in favor of the defendant, when the case was
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States upon n writ of error, where the
judgment was reversed ; that court holding the statute of Massachusetts, under
which payment of the money was compelled, was unconstitutional and void.
In the opinions of the justices in these celebrated cases, language is also used as
in the case in 11 Peters, expressive of the right of the. state in exercise of its
police power, to exclude persons from her limits, hut from the statement of the
cases, it is obvious that no such question was before the court.
VOL. XXII.-50
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the state in this respect, grew out of the necessity which the
Southern States, in which the institution of slavery existed, felt
of excluding free negroes from their limits. As in some states
negroes were citizens, the right to exclude them from the slave
states could only be maintained by the assertion of a power to exclude all persons whom they might deem dangerous or injurious to
their interests. But at this day no such power would be asserted,
or if asserted, allowed in any Federal court. And the most
serious consequences affecting the relations of the nation with other
countries might, and undoubtedly would, follow from any attempt
at its exercise. Its maintenance would enable any state to involve
the nation in war, however disposed to peace thq people at large
.might be.
Where the evil apprehended by the state from the ingress of
foreigners is that such foreigners will disregard the laws of the
state, and thus be injurious to its peace, the remedy lies in the
more vigorous enforcement of the laws, not in the exclusion of the
parties. Gambling is considered by moststates to be injurious to
the morals of their people, and is made a public offence. It would
hardly be considered as a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the states to prevent a foreigner who had been a gambler in his
own country from landing in ours. If, after landing, he pursues
his former occupation, fine him, and, if he persists in it, imprison
him, and the evil will be remedied. In some states the manufacture and sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors are forbidden
and punished as a misdemeanor. If the foreigner coming to our
shores is a manufacturer or dealer in such liquors, it would be
deemed an illegitimate exercise of the police power to exclude him,
on account of his calling, from the state. The remedy against any
.apprehended manufacture and sale would lie in such case in the
enforcement of the penal laws of the state. So if lewd women, or
,lewd men, even if the latter be of that baser sort, who, when Paul
preached at Thessalonica, set all the city in an uproar (Acts xvii.
verse 5), land on our shores, the remedy must be found in good
Jaws, or good municipal iegulations and a vigorous police.
It is evident that if the possible violation of the laws of the state
by an emigrant, or the supposed immorality of his past life or profession, where that immorality has not already resulted in a con,viction for a felony, is to determine his right to land and to reside
in the state, or to pass through into other and interior states, a
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door will be opened to all sorts of oppression. The doctrine now
asserted by counsel for the Commissioner of Immigration, if maintained, would certainly be invoked, and at no distant (lay, when
other parties, besides low and despised Chinese women, are the
subjects of its application, and would then be seen to be a grievous
departure from principle.
I am aware of the very general feeling prevailing in this state
against the Chinese, and in opposition to the extension of any encouragement to their immigration hither. It is felt that the dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in language, in manners, religion and habits, will always prevent any possible assimilation of
them with our people. Admitting that there is ground for this
feeling, it does not justify any legislation for their exclusion, which
might not be adopted against the inhabitants of the most favored
nations of the Caucasian race, and of Christian faith. If their
further immigration is to be stopped, recourse must be had to the
Federal Government, where the whole power over this subject lies.
The state cannot exclude them arbitrarily, nor accomplish the same
end by attributing to them a possible violation of its municipal
laws. It is certainly desirable that all lewdness, especially when
it takes the form of prostitution, should be suppressed, and that
the most stringent measures to accomplish tht end should be
adopted. But I have little respect for that discriminating virtue
which is shocked when a frail child of China is landed on our shores,
and yet allows the bedizened and painted harlot of other countries
to parade our streets and open her hells in broad day, without molestation and without censure.
By the 5th Article of the treaty between the United States and
China, adopted on the 28th of July 1868, the United States and
the Emperor of China recognise the inherent and inalienable right
of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and
subjects respectively from the one country to another, for purposes
of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. The 6th Article
declares that citizens of the United States visiting or residing in
China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities or exemptions in
respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens
or subjects of the most favored nation. And, reciprocally, that
Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall
enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to
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travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens or subjects
of the most favored nation.
The only limitation upon the freeinigress into the United States
and egress from them of subjects of China is the limitation which
is applied to citizens or subjects of the most favored nation ; and as
the General Government has not seen fit to attach any limitation to
the ingress of subjects of those nations, none can be applied to the
subjects of China. And the power of exclusion by the state, as
we have already said, extends only to convicts, lepers and persons
incurably diseased, and to paupers and persons who, from physical
causes, are likely to become a public charge. The detention of
the petitioner is therefore unlawful under the treaty.
But there is another view of this case equally conclusive for the
discharge of the petitioner, which is founded upon the legislation
of Congress since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That amendment in its first section desigpates who are citizens of
.the United States, and then declares that no state shall make or
enforce any law which abridges their privileges and immunities.
It also enacts that no state shall deprive any person (dropping the
distinctive designation of citizens) of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person the equal
.protection of the laws. The great fundamental rights of all citizens are thus secured against any state deprivation, and all persons,
• whether native or foreign, high or low, are, whilst within the jurisdiction of the United States, entitled to the equal protection of
the laws. Discriminating and partial legislation, favoring particular persons, or against particular persons of the same claus, is
now prohibited. Equality of privilege is the constitutional right
of all citizens, and equality of protection is the constitutional
right of all persons. And equallty of protection implies not only
* equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of
wrongs, and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption with
others of the same class,from all chargesand burdensof every kind.
-Within these limits the power of the state exists, as it did previously to the adoption of the amendment, over all matters of
internal police. And within these limits the Act of Congress of
May 31st 1870 restricts the action of the state with respect to
foreigners immigrating to our country. "No tax or charge,"
says the act, " shall be imposed or enforced by any state upon any
person immigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not

